Worth L. Annette C. Orton v. Collection Division of Utah State Tax Commission : Unknown by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
1993
Worth L. Annette C. Orton v. Collection Division
of Utah State Tax Commission : Unknown
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Unknown.
Unknown.
This Legal Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of Appeals
Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Legal Brief, Worth L. Annette C. Orton v. Collection Division of Utah State Tax Commission, No. 930320 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1993).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1/5211
ITAH 
iQCUu'.tXi 
,FU 
0 
\io 
JOCKET NO. 
*&M?0 
J A N G R A H A M 
ATTORNEY GENERAL 
FILED 
Utah Court of Appeals 
SEP 2 7 1993 
MaryT.Nnonan 
P/Ufi&rtfc*Bieou't 
Director of Public Policy & Communications 
JOHN F CLARK 
Counsel to the Attorney General 
CAROL CLAWSON 
Solicitor General 
REED RICHARDS 
Chief Deputy Attorney General 
September 27, 1993 
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230 South 500 East, Suite 400 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Re: Worth L. and Annette C. Orton v. Collection Division 
of the Utah State Tax Commission, Case No. 930320-CA 
Dear Ms. Noonan: 
Pursuant to Rule 24(j) of the Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure, this letter is written to inform the Court of 
pertinent and significant authorities which have come to the 
attention of the Respondent after the brief had been filed and 
before oral argument. These supplementary cases apply to pages 
1-2 of the brief of Respondent relating to the jurisdiction of 
this Court and whether the appeal was timely filed. 
The cases enclosed with this letter and considered as 
supplemental are: 
1. Lopez v. Career Services Review Board, 834 P.2d 568, 
571 (Utah App. 1992) 
2. Ford Motor Company v. Iowa Dep't of Transportation 
Regulation Board, 282 N.W.2d 701 (Iowa 1979) 
3. Davis v. Alabama Medicaid Agency, 519 S.2d 538 (Ala. 
App. 1987) 
Yours very truly, 
Gale K. Francis 
Assistant Attorney General 
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today and make that a part of the record 
and I will consider the timeliness and 
determine from that whether I can con 
sider the merits. 
The administrative law judge Av: . . . 
lead Armstrong such that her riy:h* to a 
fair hearing was jeopardized 
[5] Armstrong also argt« due 
process rights were < tl e 
short duration of tht \*«> 
disagree. The Utah Mipreme Coun pre* ) 
ously rejected this argument in addressing 
the short statutory appeals period for those 
appealing judgments from small clain is 
courts. Before a 1988 amendment in-
creased the appeals period to ten days, an 
appellant had. only five days in which to 
appeal a small claims court judgment 
Nevertheless, the supreme court found this 
time period did not deprive appellants of 
their constitutional rights. See, e.g., La, 
son Ford Sales, Inc. v. Silver, 551 P.2d 
233, .233 (Utah) (small claims court appel-
lant having five days to appeal is not de-
nied equal protection and is "given a rea-
sonable time within which to take an ap-
pear ') , appeal dismissed 429 U.S. 909, 97 
S.Ct. 299, 50 L.Ed.2d 277 (1976); accoi d 
Hume v. Small Claims Courtt 590 P.2d 
309, 311 (Utah 1979); see also Kapetanov 
v. Small Claims Court, 659 P.2d 1049, 
1052 (Utah 1983) (small claims courts ' five-
day appeals period does not offend due 
process and fact that other civil appellants 
have a thirty-day appeals period, '"is of no 
consequence"). 
CONCLUSION 
We conclude the Board, did not err ii I 
declining to address the merits of Arm 
strong's untimely appeal. Armstrong 
failed, to demonstrate good cause for filing 
her appeal late, the deadline for filing an 
appeal is not ambiguous, and Armstrong's 
constitutional rights were not jeopardized. 
Therefore, we affirm,... 
ORME and. RUSSON, JX, concur. 
George A, LOI ""EZ, Peti t ioner, 
v. 
I \RKER SERVICE R E \ IEW BOARD 
cl 11 in.d iistri,a. 1 Co minission of 
Utah, Respondents 
No 910501-C A 
Court of Appeals of Utah. 
May 27, 1992, 
State employee sought review of juris-
dictional hearing conducted by Career Ser-
vice Review Board wherein Board deter-
mined that it did not have jurisdiction to 
hear his employment grievance. The Court 
of Appeals, Bench, P.J., held that: (1) pro-
ceeding was a formal adjudicative one that 
it could properly review; (2) letter from 
hearing officer was not "written order" 
and employee's petition for judicial review, 
filed within 30 days of date his request for 
reconsideration of hearing officer's decision 
was deemed denied, was timely; (3) hear-
ing officer's refusal to consider employee's 
written proffer of facts did not violate due 
process; and, (4) Board lacked jurisdiction, 
insofar as employee was not subjected to 
"de facto suspension" when he opted to 
take unpaid leave of absence in order to 
attend law school, and employing agency 
did. not violate personnel rule by deciding 
rv ' to allow him, to job share. 
II I dminist-3t?"<* T °w and Procedure 
<&=>796 
Questions regarding whether adminis-
trative agency has afforded petitioner due 
process in its hearings are questions of 
law, and court therefore does not give def-
erence to agency's actions. U.S.C.A. 
Const.Amends. 5, 14 
2, Appeal and Er ro ; 3=>842<1> 
Jurisdictional determinations are ques-
tions of law to wh l- C »-• -)eals 
gives no deference 
Cite as 834 P.2d 568 
3. Administrative Law and Procedure 
<e=>701 
Officers and Public Employees <§=>72.41 
Administrative appeal by state employ-
ee seeking review of jurisdictional hearing 
conducted by Career Service Review Board, 
wherein Board determined that it did not 
have jurisdiction to hear employee's griev-
ance, was formal adjudicative proceeding 
that Court of Appeals could properly re-
view; hearing was conducted and there 
was no showing that any of the statutory 
requirements of formal hearing set forth in 
Utah Administrative Procedure Act had not 
been met. U.C.A.1953, 63-46b-8, 63-46b~ 
16. 
4. Administrative Law and Procedure 
<S=>723 
Officers and Public Employees <§=>72.47 
Hearing officer's letter sent nine days 
after state employee requested that officer 
reconsider her decision, stating that officer 
had read employee's motion and that it had 
not persuaded her to change her decision, 
was not "written order" within meaning of 
Utah Administrative Procedure Act, inso-
far as it was not sufficiently detailed; thus, 
employee's request for reconsideration was 
deemed denied as matter of law 20 days 
after it was filed, and his petition for judi-
cial review, filed within 30 days of deemed 
denial, was timely. U.C.A.1953, 63-46b-
10(1), 63-46b-13(3)(a, b), 63-46b-14(3)(a). 
See publication Words and Phrases 
for other judicial constructions and 
definitions. 
5. Administrative Law and Procedure 
<S=>469 
Constitutional Law e=>278.4(5) 
Officers and Public Employees <s=>72.16 
Even if hearing officer improperly re-
fused to consider state employee's written 
proffer of facts, that refusal did not violate 
due process, absent showing that hearing 
officer's actions were patently unfair; em-
ployee was allowed to testify at length in 
lieu of written statement, which did not 
contain a single fact that employee was not 
allowed to present orally. U.S.C.A. Const. 
Amends. 5, 14. 
(UtahApp. 1992) 
6. Officers and Public Employees <3=>72.61 
State employee had burden of showing 
that his grievance fit into statutorily desig-
nated category in order to bring that griev-
ance before Career Service Review Board. 
U.C.A.1953, 67-19a-202(l). 
7. Officers and Public Employees <a=>72.22 
For purposes of determining whether 
Career Service Review Board had jurisdic-
tion of its grievance, senior investigator 
with Utah State Industrial Commission was 
not given "de facto suspension" when Com-
mission required him to take unpaid leave 
of absence in order to attend law school; 
employee made conscious decision to attend 
law school after being formally notified 
that he would be required to take a leave of 
absence if he did so. U.C.A.1953, 67-19a-
202(1). 
8. Officers and Public Employees e=>72.22 
For purposes of determining whether 
Career Service Review Board had jurisdic-
tion to hear state employee's grievance, 
Utah State Industrial Commission's deci-
sion not to allow senior investigator to job 
share did not violate personnel rule, insofar 
as rule gave Commission full discretion as 
to whether job sharing would be allowed. 
U.C.A.1953, 67-19a-202(l). 
Lynn J. Lund, Salt Lake City, for peti-
tioner. 
Benjamin A. Sims and Thomas C. Sturdy, 
Salt Lake City, for respondents. 
Before BENCH, P.J., and ORME and 
RUSSON, JJ. 
BENCH, Presiding Judge: 
Petitioner Lopez seeks review of a juris-
dictional hearing conducted by respondent 
Career Service Review Board (the Board), 
wherein the Board determined that it did 
not have jurisdiction to hear Lopez's em-
ployment grievance. We affirm. 
FACTS 
Lopez is a senior investigator with the 
Utah State Industrial Commission (the 
Commission). He claims that in 1989 he 
V l \J w i * * n 5M r,Ai ; IM( ; REPORTER, 2d SERIES 
saw a clear trend by the Commission •• 
wards using investigators with legal train-
ing.1 Since Lopez had no legal training, he 
decided that it would be to his professional 
advantage to attend law school. He ap-
plied for and was accepted to the Universi-
ty of Utah law school. Upon learning of 
1
 • oceptance, Lopez requested that he be 
ed to work part-time while attending 
lav M hool. His immediate supervisor in-
H! him in writing that his proposal to 
. ... part-time was rejected. Lopez never-
theless pursued additional discussions in an 
attempt to accommodate the interests of 
the Commission. Various alternatives 
were discussed, but none was accepted 
Lopez claims that at one point in n> 
discussions his supervisor asked him t<-
draft a contract reflecting his proposal t«-
work part-time on a job share basis. Lope;. 
assumed that the request indicated that his 
job share proposal had been accepted. Tl i.e 
contract he prepared, however, was never 
expressly accepted or rejected by the Com-
mission. 
I K)pez went to law school : . •: - : * * 
proposed plan was that he w--- * • .-- ' -
annual leave while adjusting lo law-scnoul 
life. He therefore took approximately one 
month of annual leave at the beginning of 
the school year. When he attempted to 
return to work part-time, however, he was 
informed that his proposal to job share v. it-
still unacceptable. The Commission of 
fered him the opportunity to work at a 
temporary level for */ hours a \w-"k. but. 
because it was a *• = •; < rary position, lie 
would be required i< rvimquish his care*-** 
service status. In the alternative, the Com 
mission was willing to grant him a leave of 
absence without pay, thereby keeping his 
status intact. The only other alternative 
was for him simply to resign his position, 
Lopez opted to take the leave of absence 
1. The Commission denies an\ trend -.Hit it does 
admit that in advertisements fur in\ irrigators it 
had indicated that preference would be piven to 
those with legal training 
2. The Commission asserts \\\a\ . \\ ' ;: < * U-A 
govern this case because I \l: i d-." - .-. -,--•*• 
to "internal personnel acti.^r- -...if
 ;. agency 
concerning its own empliU'f ; .e.wial re-
view of those actions." Senior ti^-M^i»-l(2)(e). 
The Board errs in asserting that the Board's 
•- •: under protest, signed an agreement to 
that effect. Following his first year of law 
school, Lopez returned to full-time work 
with the Commission in his former position. 
Lopez filed a grievance that progressed 
unsuccessfully through the Commission's 
internal review process. Lopez then re-
quested an evidentiary hearing before the 
Board. Inasmuch as there was some ques-
tion whether the Board was authorized to 
hear the grievance, the administrator of 
the Board ordered that a jurisdictional 
hearing be conducted. The administrator 
then recused himself due to a conflict 
caused by his involvement with an advisory 
b-i.-.rd -*f the Commission, and a hearing 
ofiu-er w,i> appointed to cor -iurt «h»- hear-
ing 
•• .i:<. lieai,n^. 1^ 4n-z "proffered" his 
version of the facts in writing. The hear-
ing officer refused to ace-; * his written 
version due to its length and argumenta-
tive nature. The Commission proposed its 
"chronology" of events and doc-
uments, which was admitted without objec-
tion from Lopez. Lopez was then allowed 
*o testify as to any facts he felt were 
relevant. His counsel questioned him for 
approximately three hours. The hearing 
uffuvr then ruled that the grievance did 
i.t * • «-me within any of the statutory cate-
gories over which the Board had jurisdic-
tion The hearing officer further held that 
Lopez was not harmed by the Commission's 
actions because he was allowed to return to 
his former position after the leave of ab-
sence. 
I) i accordance with section 13 of tl le Utah 
Administrative Procedures Act (UAPA), 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-l to -22 (1989), 
Lopez requested that the hearing officer 
reconsider her decision.2 The decision was 
not altered, and Lopez filed this petition for 
actions constitute "internal personnel actions 
within an agency." The Board is an agency 
external to the Commission to which personnel 
matters are appealed. UAPA therefore applies. 
This conclusion is supported by statutory lan-
guage within the chapter establishing the Board 
that indicates UAPA applies to actions by the 
Board. See, e.g., Utah Code Ann. §§ 67-19a-
202(?^ «"- i - - w * 1 " )86) 
LOPEZ v. CAREER SERVICE REVIEW BD 
Cite as 834 P.2d 568 (Utah App. 1992) 
Hal 
review. He alleges three principal errors 
by the hearing officer; (1) the refusal < 
accept his written proffer of facts was • 
denial of due process, (2) the conclu^ioi 
that the Board did not have jurisdiction to 
hear his grievance was erroneous, and (3) 
the finding that he was not harmed by the 
Commission's actions was clearly errone-
ous. 
STANDARD OJ K U IKW 
[1,2] Questions regarding whetl :tei an 
administrative agency has afforded a peti-
tioner due process in its hearings are ques-
tions of law. We therefore do not give 
deference to the agency's actions. Tolman 
v. Salt Lake County Attorney, 818 P.2d 
23, 28 (Utah App.1991). Jurisdictional de-
terminations are questions of law to which 
we give no deference. Department qf So-
cial Servs. v. Vijil, 784 P.2d 1130, ' 1132 
(Utah 1989). 
OUR JURISDICTION 
Before addressing the merits of the peti-
tion. \w consider two threshold questions 
ns U> : /""Oir this court, has jurisdiction 
Formal or Informal Proceedings 
[3] The first jurisdictional question in 
volves whether this administrative appeal 
should be before the district court. UAPA 
provides that district courts have exclusive 
jurisdiction over administrative appeals 
from informal adjudicative proceedings. 
Section 63-46b-15. Administrative appeals 
from formal adjudicative proceedings are 
to be made either to this court or to the 
supreme court. Section 63-46b~16. 
Administrative appeals that are improp 
-rb brought to this court are to be trans-
- •• -I to the district court pursuant to 
Rule of Appellate Procedure 44. 
.-^shbaugh White, 800 P.2d 825 (Utah 
App.1990). : \lumbaugh, the administra-
tor of the Career Services Review Board 
conducted an administrative review of an 
employee's grievance file without a hear-
ing. We held that the absence of a hearing 
made the Board's action informal, despite 
the Board's designation of all adjudicative 
proceedings as formal, and transferred «.>t 
a<t to district court for a trial de novo. 
present case, the hearing officer 
*d a hearing. Lopez was allowed 
to appear before the hearing officer and to 
:^ <»w.nt his position. Evidence and doc-
uments were accepted into the record, and 
a court reporter was present. There has 
been no showing that any of the require 
ments of a formal hearing, as set forth in 
section 8 of UAPA, have not been met. 
Since there was a hearing, and there is no 
showing of any violations of section 8, we 
conclude that this was a formal adjudica-
tive proceeding that we may properly re-
view 
Timehn* s> 
11. T';e soconti jurisdictional question 
mvolves the timeliness of Lopez's petition 
lo this court. The hearing officer entered 
her decision on July 2. 1991, Lopez re-
quested on July 22nd that the hearing offi-
cer reconsider her decision, Or: July 31st, 
the hearing officer sent Lopez a letter, 
The full text of the letter was as follows: 
"I have read your Motion for Reconsidera-
tion and Evidentiary Hearing. This let-
ter is to notify you that your motion has 
not persuaded me to change my decision " 
Lopez filed this petitior f.»r n - ,* A on S^ 
tember 3rd, 
Subsection 14(3)(a) of UAPA pi.. ••:• 
"A party shall file a petition for JUU.K 
review of final agency action within :• 
days after the date that the order constiti/ 
ing the final agency action is issued or -
considered to be issued under Subsection 
63-46b-13(3)(b)." Subsection 13(3) applie> 
to requests that an agency reconsid^*- ^ 
action and provides: 
(a) The agency head, or a person desig-
nated for that purpose, shall issue a writ-
ten order granting the request or deny-
ing the request. 
(lb) If the agency head or the person 
designated for that purpose does not is 
sue an order within 20 days after the 
filing of the request, the request for 
reconsideration shall be considered to be 
denied 
The issue is whether the letter from the 
hearing officer constitutes a ''written or-
der." If it does, then Lopez's appeal is 
untimely, the thirty days having run their 
course on August 30th, four days before 
Lopez filed his petition. If the letter did 
not constitute a written order, then Lopez's 
request for reconsideration was deemed de-
nied, as a matter of law, on August 11th, 
twenty days from his request. Lopez's 
filing on September 3rd would therefore be 
timely. 
Section 10 of UAPA requires considera-
ble detail in agency orders issued in connec-
tion with formal adjudicative proceedings. 
It states, in pertinent part: 
(1) Within a reasonable time after the 
hearing, or after the filing of any post-
hearing papers permitted by the presid-
ing officer, or within the time required 
by any applicable statute or rule of the 
agency, the presiding officer shall sign 
and issue an order that includes: 
(a) a statement of the presiding offi-
cer's findings of fact . . . ; 
(b) a statement of the presiding offi-
cer's conclusions of law; 
(c) a statement of the reasons for 
the presiding officer's decision; 
(d) a statement of any relief ordered 
by the agency; 
(e) a notice of the right to apply for 
reconsideration; 
(f) a notice of any right to adminis-
trative or judicial review of the order 
available to aggrieved parties; and 
(g) the time limits applicable to any 
reconsideration or review. 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-10 (1989). 
An ambiguous letter, merely indicating 
that the request for reconsideration was 
unpersuasive, does not constitute a "writ-
ten order" as described in subsection 10(1). 
As a matter of appellate necessity, we 
must have unambiguous final administra-
tive orders from which we may calculate 
jurisdictional time periods. Otherwise, our 
jurisdiction can become uncertain. 
Inasmuch as the hearing officer's letter 
was insufficient to constitute a written or-
der as anticipated by subsection 13(3)(a), 
Lopez's request for reconsideration is 
deemed denied on August 11th under sub-
section 13(3)(b). His petition for review is 
therefore timely. 
THE MERITS 
Proffer of Facts 
[5] Lopez first asserts that the hearing 
officer denied him due process by not con-
sidering his written proffer of facts. He 
relies upon Tolman for the proposition that 
"due process demands a new trial when the 
appearance of unfairness is so plain that 
[the appellate court is] left with the abiding 
impression that a reasonable person would 
find the hearing unfair." Tolman, 818 
P.2d at 28 (quoting Bunnell v. Industrial 
Comm'n, 740 P.2d 1331, 1333 n. 1 (Utah 
1987)). Even if it were improper for the 
hearing officer to refuse to consider Lo-
pez's written version of the facts, as assert-
ed by Lopez, he has nevertheless failed to 
present to this court any explanation of 
how the actions of the hearing officer were 
patently unfair. At the hearing, Lopez 
was allowed to testify at length in lieu of 
the written statement. He has not directed 
us to a single fact contained in the written 
statement that he was not allowed to 
present orally to the hearing officer. Giv-
en Lopez's opportunity to testify, we sim-
ply are not left with an abiding impression 
that a reasonable person would find the 
hearing unfair. 
Jurisdiction of Board 
The Board was established to provide 
state civil service employees with a forum 
for appealing personnel decisions outside 
the agency for which they work. The 
Board, however, does not have jurisdiction 
to hear all appeals of all personnel matters. 
Its jurisdiction is statutorily limited to cer-
tain agency actions. 
(a) The board shall serve as the final 
administrative body to review appeals 
from career service employees and agen-
cies of decisions about promotions, dis-
missals, demotions, suspensions, written 
reprimands, wages, salary, violations of 
personnel rules, issues concerning the eq-
uitable administration of benefits, reduc-
LOPEZ v. CAREER SERVICE REVIEW BD. 
Cite a* 834 P.2d 568 (UtahApp. 1992) 
Utah 573 
tions in force, and disputes concerning 
abandonment of position that have not 
been resolved at an earlier stage in the 
grievance procedure. 
(b) The board has no jurisdiction to 
review or decide any other personnel 
matters. 
Utah Code Ann. § 67-19a-202(l) (Supp. 
1991) (emphasis added).3 
When an employee files a grievance with 
the Board, subsection 403(2)(a) requires the 
Board's administrator to determine the fol-
lowing factors before the Board may hear 
the grievance. 
(i) whether or not the employee is a 
career service employee and is entitled to 
use the grievance system, 
(ii) whether or not the board has juris-
diction over the grievance, 
(iii) whether or not the employee has 
been directly harmed; and 
(iv) the issues to be heard. 
Utah Code Ann. § 67-19a-403(2)(a) (Supp. 
1991). 
In order to make the determinations re-
quired, the administrator may "hold a juris-
dictional hearing, where the parties may 
present oral arguments, written argu-
ments, or both/' Subsection 67-19a-
403(2)(b)(i). This was the basis and goal of 
the jurisdictional hearing from which Lopez 
now appeals.4 
[6] Lopez initially challenges the hear-
ing officer's determination that the Board 
lacked jurisdiction by asserting that the 
Board's administrator erroneously placed 
the "burden of proof" on Lopez to prove 
that the Board had jurisdiction. It is axio-
matic that a party wishing to bring a mat-
ter before a tribunal with limited subject 
matter jurisdiction must present sufficient 
facts to invoke the limited jurisdiction of 
that tribunal. Department of Social 
3. All other matters may be grieved only to the 
level of the department head whose decision is 
final and unappealable to the Board. See Utah 
Code Ann. § 67-19a-302(2) (Supp.1991). 
4. Lopez asserts that the hearing officer improp-
erly treated the jurisdictional hearing as a hear-
ing on the merits. There is some language in 
the hearing officer's decision that supports his 
claim. As indicated in subsection 403(2)(b), the 
jurisdictional hearing is to consider the four 
Servs. v. Vijil, 784 P.2d 1130, 1132 (Utah 
1989). It was therefore necessary for Lo-
pez to show that his grievance fit into one 
of the categories of grievances designated 
in subsection 202(1) in order to bring his 
grievance before the Board. 
[7] Lopez argues the Board has juris-
diction because the Commission's require-
ment that he take a leave of absence with-
out pay was a "de facto suspension." The 
hearing officer, however, found that Lopez 
made a conscious decision to attend law 
school and that his decision was made after 
he had been formally notified that he would 
be required to take a leave of absence if he 
were to attend law school. The hearing 
officer also found that the ongoing discus-
sions between Lopez and the Commission 
concerning other possible work alternatives 
had not resulted in a meeting of the minds. 
Given the hearing officer's factual find-
ings, it is clear that the unpaid leave of 
absence was the direct result of Lopez's 
unilateral and voluntary decision to attend 
law school. It was not in any way initiated 
by the Commission. The record is clear 
that Lopez was always free to remain in 
his job full time as long as he did not elect 
to attend law school. He may not now 
transform the direct result of his own vol-
untary decision into a "de facto suspen-
sion" by the Commission. 
[8] Lopez also argues that the Commis-
sion violated several personnel rules when 
it refused to allow him to work during law 
school. As stated in subsection 202(1), 
grievances arising from violations of per-
sonnel rules are within the Board's jurisdic-
tion. Lopez points to Human Resource 
Management Rule R468-5-12, which states 
with our emphasis: 
factors set out in subsection 403(2)(a). If an 
employee's grievance meets the statutory re-
quirements in subsection 403(2)(a), the employ-
ee is entitled to a hearing on the merits of the 
claim. Any language suggesting that the hear-
ing officer considered the actual merits of Lo-
pez's grievance was nevertheless harmless since 
the factual findings clearly show that jurisdic-
tion was lacking as a matter of law. 
Oil v"*" 004 jT^\^iriVy IVEJT v^rvi E*KI, £ U ^EJIXIEJO 
Agency management may establish a 
program of job sharing as a means of 
increasing opportunities for career part-
time employment. In the absence of an 
agency program, individual employees 
may request approval for job sharing 
status through agency management. 
Utah Admin.Code § R468-5-12 (1991). 
The hearing officer held that the Com-
mission's decision not to allow Lopez to job 
share was not a violation of this policy 
because the rule gives the Commission full 
discretion whether to allow job sharing. 
The hearing officer reasoned that since 
there was no mandate that job sharing be 
allowed, job sharing was a privilege that 
might be granted by the Commission, but it 
was not a right to which Lopez was entitled 
by law. Since the Commission's decision 
not to allow job sharing was within its 
discretion, Lopez's complaint could not logi-
cally constitute a claim that a personnel 
rule had been "violated." We agree. 
Discretionary personnel powers granted 
to agencies do not constitute mandates. 
Absent a statutory mandate that an em-
ployee receive a certain benefit, the em-
ployee may not demand it as a right. Since 
there was no mandate requiring the Com-
mission to allow Lopez to job share, Lopez 
has failed to identify any personnel rule 
that was violated by the Commission's re-
fusal to allow him to job share. Jurisdic-
tion therefore was properly denied.5 
Harm to Lopez 
Finally, Lopez claims that the hearing 
officer erred when she found that he had 
not been harmed by being "required" to 
take an unpaid leave of absence because he 
was able to return to his former position. 
Whether Lopez was directly harmed by the 
Commission's action is the third factor to 
be determined at a jurisdictional hearing. 
See section 67-19a-403(2)(a)(iii). However, 
the hearing officer did not need to reach 
this issue because she determined that Lo-
pez's grievance did not fall within the cate-
5. Lopez also points to the Human Resource 
Management Rules regarding "Time Limited Po-
sitions," Utah Admin.Code § R468-5-10 (1991), 
and "Education Assistance," Utah Admin.Code 
§ R468-10-4 (1991). We limit our discussion to 
gory of grievances over which the Board 
had jurisdiction. Regardless of whether or 
not Lopez was harmed, the Board could not 
hear the grievance. We therefore need not 
address this final claim of error. 
CONCLUSION 
The hearing officer's finding that the 
Board lacked jurisdiction to hear Lopez's 
grievance is affirmed. 
ORME and RUSSON, JJ., concur. 
Jasbir S. BHATIA, Petitioner, 
v. 
DEPARTMENT OF EMPLOYMENT 
SECURITY; and Pizza Hut of 
Utah, Respondents. 
No. 910498-CA. 
Court of Appeals of Utah. 
June 2, 1992. 
Cook sought judicial review of final 
decision of Board of Review of Industrial 
Commission denying his application for un-
employment compensation benefits. The 
Court of Appeals, Billings, Associate P.J., 
held that cook who stormed out of restau-
rant during middle of busy shift after ut-
tering vulgarity to manager was dis-
charged for "just cause" and not entitled to 
unemployment compensation benefits. 
Affirmed. 
Bench, P.J., concurred and filed opin-
ion. 
the policy on job sharing since our analysis 
applies equally to all three policies. Under 
these rules, agencies are given the ability to 
create time limited positions and provide edu-
cation assistance in their discretion. 
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issue in dispute or to the issue of credibil-
ity 
Relevancy on the other hand, relates to 
the probative value of evidence in rela-
tion to the purpose for which it is offered. 
We further stated in Clay: 
The law of evidence does teach what 
evidentiary facts are incompetent be-
cause in violation of the exclusionary 
rules. But as to irrelevant and immateri-
al matters logic and reasoning processes 
are the only tests. 
Clay, 213 N.W.2d at 477. See State v. 
O'Connell, 275 N.W.2d 197, 203 (Iowa 1979); 
State v. Kaufman, 265 N.W.2d 610, 619-20 
(Iowa 1978). 
[1] The determination of relevancy is 
vested in trial court's discretion. O'Connell, 
275 N.W.2d at 203; Kaufman, 265 N.W.2d 
at 619. 
The scope of our review is for correction 
of errors of law. Iowa R.App.P. 4. 
[2] I. Usual medical practice. The 
pleadings in this case present us with an 
unusual relevancy problem. Mercer con-
tends evidence of usual medical practice 
adduced at trial is not relevant to the issue 
of her consent to a venogram of her right 
leg. Allegations of such medical battery, 
however, are ordinarily combined with alle-
gations of negligence. See Perin v. Hayne, 
210 N.W.2d 609 (Iowa 1973). Where negli-
gence is pled, evidence of usual medical 
practice would be relevant to the standard 
of care. Presented only with allegations of 
medical battery, we must determine wheth-
er evidence of usual medical practice, 
nevertheless, may be properly admitted 
over relevancy objections under the record 
in this case. 
[3,4] Although Mercer challenges the 
relevancy of evidence of usual medical prac-
tice to the issue of consent, the evidence is 
properly admitted if relevant to any issue in 
the case. During the first one and one-half 
days of trial plaintiff sought recovery of 
punitive damages. We have said such an 
award requires a showing of "the necessary 
animus" in commission of the wrongful ac t 
White v. Citizens National Bank of Boone, 
262 N.W.2d 812, 817 (Iowa 1978). Evidence 
of usual medical practice appears relevant 
to disproving the "animus" discussed in 
White. It could logically be argued the 
tests were performed in furtherance of usu-
al medical practice rather than some inten-
tional infliction of injury or discomfort on 
the patient. Although the punitive damage 
claim was subsequently dismissed, the claim 
was included in the petition when part of 
the evidence complained of was adduced. 
[5] The relevance of usual medical prac-
tice to refutation of the punitive damage 
claim cannot justify admission of the chal-
lenged evidence after dismissal of the puni-
tive damage claim; however, subsequent 
trial developments provide an independent 
basis for admission of that evidence. Mer-
cer also complains of evidence of surgical 
implications of bilateral and unilateral ven-
ograms which was adduced after dismissal 
of the punitive damage claim. According 
to the challenged testimony a less severe 
form of surgery to restrict the movement of 
Mercer's blood clot would be and was per-
formed following the bilateral venogram. 
Although Mercer again contends such evi-
dence is not relevant to the issue of consent, 
the medical implications of a bilateral rath-
er than a unilateral venogram were opened 
by Mercer's own testimony. 
We have said a party may contradict 
testimony by showing a fact is otherwise 
than testified to by a witness. See State v. 
Wycoff, 255 N.W.2d 116, 118 (Iowa 1977) 
(evidence of conversation admissible to con-
tradict previous testimony concerning the 
same conversation. "The present situation 
is merely an illustration of the right of a 
party to contradict a witness by showing 
the fact is otherwise."). 
Following dismissal of the punitive dam-
age claim but prior to the subsequently 
challenged testimony, Mercer testified on 
direct examination in part: 
Q. What was your intention concern-
ing any proposed venogram to the right 
leg? A. I had no intention of a veno-
gram to the right leg. 
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Q. Did you have some purpose in 
mind why you didn't want a venogram to 
your right leg? A. Definitely, general 
pain and nothing wrong with the right 
leg. 
Q. Was there any other reason? A. 
Medically I didn't—medically I didn't 
think it was necessary. 
Since Mercer testified there was nothing 
wrong with her right leg which would re-
quire testing, the subject was opened for 
refutation. Defendants were entitled to in-
troduce evidence of usual medical practice 
to show medical necessity of a right leg 
venogram to diagnose possible, visually un-
detectable blood clots of the right leg. 
Mercer additionally contends evidence of 
hospital consent procedures is not relevant 
to her consent to a right leg venogram. 
Consent, however, is a factual issue in the 
present case. Existing hospital consent 
procedures, especially those followed in be-
half of Mercer by her husband, seem rele-
vant to a factual determination concerning 
the consent in issue. 
[6] II. Similar teat procedures. Short-
ly after her admission to the hospital Mer-
cer underwent lung scan tests which, testi-
mony showed, were similar in many re-
spects to venograms. Appellant Mercer 
contends in this appeal that such consent to 
lung scan tests is not relevant to the issue 
of consent to a bilateral venogram. We 
need not review the exercise of trial court's 
discretion on this issue, however, since the 
challenged evidence is admissible on an al-
ternative ground. 
We have said a party cannot complain on 
appeal of evidence which the party, himself, 
introduced into the record. See Brown v. 
First National Bank of Mason City, 193 
N.W.2d 547, 555 (Iowa 1972) (challenged 
evidence of gossip and rumor concerning 
bank investigation elicited by appellant as 
defendant at trial) and Times-Guthrian 
Publishing Co. v. Guthrie County Vedette, 
256 Iowa 302, 304, 125 N.W.2d 829, 831 
(1964) (challenged subscription card brought 
out by appellant as plaintiff at trial). The 
record reveals that Mercer introduced evi-
dence of the lung scans'" through direct ex-
amination of plaintiffs witness Dr. Dall as 
well as through introduction of hospital rec-
ords which noted administration of the lung 
scan tests. 
[7] III. Failure to resist testing. In 
her direct testimony early in the trial Mer-
cer testified she physically resisted adminis-
tration of the right leg venogram. In this 
appeal, however, appellant Mercer contends 
evidence of lack of physical resistance was 
not relevant to consent and that defendants 
thereby introduced an erroneous element of 
necessity of resistance into consent law. 
Since plaintiff Mercer, herself, testified 
to her physical resistance to the right leg 
venogram, defendants were entitled to 
present evidence in rebuttal under the au-
thorities discussed in division I above. We 
cannot say trial court erred in permitting 
the defense to contradict plaintiff's direct 
testimony. 
We have considered all contentions raised 
by plaintiff and find them to be without 
merit 
AFFIRMED. 
(p E KCYNUMKRSYSHM> 
FORD MOTOR COMPANY. 
Petitioner-Appellant. 
v. 
IOWA DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPOR-
TATION REGULATIONS BOARD, 
Respondent-Appellee, 
Bob Zimmerman Ford, Inc., 
Intervenor-Appellee. 
No. 62630. 
Supreme Court of Iowa. 
Aug. 29, 1979. 
Automobile manufacturer petitioned 
for judicial review of denial by the Trans-
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portation Regulations Board of application 
seeking to enter into a franchise agreement 
for a new automobile dealership. The Polk 
District Court, A. B. Crouch, J., sustained 
motion to dismiss, and appeal was taken. 
The Supreme Court, Harris, J., held that: 
(1) where application for rehearing of ad-
ministrative decision was filed March 22, 
1978, it was deemed denied 20 days later, on 
April 11, 1978, when it had not been ruled 
on by the agency, and thus 80-day period 
for applying for judicial review ended May 
11, 1978, even though the agency filed a 
written denial of the application for rehear-
ing on April 14, 1978, and (2) failure to 
timely file application for judicial review 
was a jurisdictional defect. 
Affirmed. 
1. Administrative Law and Procedure 
«=>722 
Where application for rehearing of ad-
ministrative decision was filed March 22, 
1978, it was deemed denied 20 days later, on 
April 11, 1978, when it had not been ruled 
on by the agency, and thus 30-day period 
for applying for judicial review ended May 
11, 1978, even though the agency filed a 
written denial of the application for rehear-
ing on April 14, 1978. I.C.A. §§ 17A.16, 
subd. 2, 17A.19, 17A.19, subd. 3. 
2. Automobiles *=»84 
Failure to timely file application for 
judicial review of ruling of the Transporta-
tion Regulations Board denying application 
to enter into an automobile franchise agree-
ment was a jurisdictional defect. I.C.A. 
§§ 17A.16, subd. 2, 17A.19, 17A.19, subd. 3. 
Robert F. Holz, Jr. and Edwin N. Mcin-
tosh, Des Moines, for appellant. 
T. Scott Bannister and Martha Martell, 
Des Moines, for respondent-appellee. 
Joseph E. Day of Hines, Pence, Day & 
Powers, Cedar Rapids, and W. Don Brittin, 
Jr., of Nyemaster, Goode, McLaughlin, Em-
ery & O'Brien, Des Moines, for intervenor-
appellee. 
Considered by REYNOLDSON, C. J., and 
UHLENHOPP, HARRIS, McCORMICK, 
and LARSON, JJ. 
HARRIS, Justice. 
This appeal turns on whether a petition 
for judicial review of an administrative ac-
tion was timely. The trial court held the 
petition was not timely and that the tardi-
ness was fatal to its jurisdiction. We agree. 
Ford Motor Company filed an application 
with the transportation regulation board of 
the Iowa department of transportation, 
pursuant to section 322A.6, The Code 1975, 
seeking to enter into a franchise agreement 
for a new Ford dealership in Cedar Rapids. 
The application was resisted by various in-
tervening Ford dealers located in the area, 
including Bob Zimmerman Ford, Inc. Fol-
lowing a hearing the department denied 
Ford's application. 
Ford filed an application for rehearing, 
pursuant to section 17A. 16(2), The Code 
1977 (Iowa Administrative Procedure Act). 
The department denied Ford's motion for 
rehearing. Ford thereafter petitioned for 
judicial review of the department's decision, 
pursuant to section 17A.19, The Code 1977. 
Bob Zimmerman Ford moved to dismiss the 
petition as untimely. This appeal is from a 
trial court ruling sustaining Zimmerman's 
motion to dismiss. 
[1] I. The question calls for interpreta-
tion of the following provisions from the 
administrative procedure act: 
Any party may file an application for 
rehearing, stating the specific grounds 
therefor and the relief sought, within 
twenty days after the issuance of any 
final decision by the agency in a contest-
ed case. A copy of such application shall 
be timely mailed by the applicant to all 
parties of record not joining therein. 
Such an application for rehearing shall be 
deemed to have been denied unless the 
agency grants the application within 
twenty days after its filing. 
§ 17A.16(2) (emphasis added). 
If a party files an application under 
section 17 A. 16, subsection 2, for rehearing 
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with the agency, the petition for judicial 
review must be filed within thirty days 
after that application has been denied or 
deemed denied. 
§ 17A.19(3) (emphasis added). 
Ford's difficulty stems from the fact that 
its application for rehearing was "deemed 
denied" under section 17A.16(2) before the 
agency's written denial was filed. But 
Ford ignored the "deemed denied" provision 
of the statute and paced its subsequent 
filing timetable from the date the written 
denial was filed. The dates were as fol-
lows: Ford's application for rehearing (un-
der section 17A. 16(2)) was filed March 22, 
1978. By operation of the statute this ap-
plication was deemed denied April 11, 1978, 
when it had not been ruled upon by the 
agency. Nevertheless, the agency filed a 
written denial of the application April 14, 
1978. Under section 17A.19(3) Ford had 30 
days in which to petition for judicial review. 
The statute states that the 30-day period 
begins to run when the application before 
the agency "has been denied or deemed 
denied." 
Because the application before the agen-
cy was deemed denied April 11, the applica-
tion for judicial review was due May 11, 
1978. The trial court dismissed the pro-
ceeding because it was not filed until May 
12, 1978. 
[2] II. In Kerr v. Iowa Public Service 
Co., 274 N.W.2d 283, 287 (Iowa 1979), we 
pointed out: 
Judicial review of the administrative pro-
ceedings is a right conferred by statute. 
[Authorities.] 
We have said that where a right of 
judicial review is statutory, the procedure 
prescribed, by the statute must be fol-
lowed. [Authority.] [FJailure 
to satisfy requirements of § 17A.19 [is] a 
jurisdictional defect 
See Richards v. Iowa State Commerce Com-
mission, 270 N.W.2d 616, 619 (Iowa 1978); 
Iowa Public Service Company v. Iowa State 
Commerce Commission, 263 N.W.2d 766, 770 
(Iowa 1978). 
Ford argues that some administrative 
agencies might, for various reasons, meet 
irregularly. Under the trial court's inter-
pretation of section 17A.19(3)—which we 
adopt—inability to meet within the statuto-
ry period would rob the agency of its juris-
diction to act on an application to review its 
own decision. Ford assails this interpreta-
tion as at once harsh and absurd. 
We conceded that the operation of the 
statute might seem harsh, especially where, 
as here, a party might have been misled by 
the nullity of a later filing. Nevertheless, 
we believe that the statutory scheme is 
neither absurd nor unfair. Parties to the 
proceedings have a need for and a right to a 
prompt disposition of a dispute. We are 
confident that the legislature was fully 
aware that administrative agencies might 
meet irregularly. Hence, in the interests of 
a prompt disposition of disputes, the legisla-
ture superimposed an automatic denial of 
any application not ruled upon within the 
prescribed period. 
Regrettable hardships may well result to 
litigants who are unaware of the "deemed 
denied" provision of the statute. But it is 
in the over-all interests of litigants and the 
public at large that administrative proceed-
ings move to a prompt conclusion. The 
legislature obviously had the broader public 
interest in mind in adopting the statute. 
The trial court was right in determining 
that Ford's petition for judicial review was 
untimely. 
AFFIRMED. 
o I MYNUMEimim^ 
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Annot, 10 A.L.R.Fed. 881, 891 (1972) (em-
phasis supplied). That is, alimony in gross 
is dischargeable in bankruptcy. 
For the reasons given, this case is re-
versed and remanded to the trial court for 
entry of an order consistent with this opin-
ion. 
REVERSED AND REMANDED. 
BRADLEY, PJ., and INGRAM, J., 
concur. 
(o i KEY NUMNR SYSTEM! 
Flora L. DAVIS 
v. 
ALABAMA MEDICAID AGENCY, mid 
Michael Horsley, as CommlMloiier. 
Civ. 6114. 
Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama* 
Dec. 9, 1987. 
State medicaid agency determined ap-
plicant was disqualified from receiving 
medicaid benefits for period of three 
months and notified applicant of determina-
tion on January 16. Applicant filed rehear-
ing application on January 27, was advised 
of denial of her rehearing and notified that 
judicial review could be had pursuant to 
statute by letter dated March 10, and for-
warded notice of appeal by letter dated 
April 9. The Circuit Court, Montgomery 
County, William R. Gordon, J., found the 
applicant's notice of appeal was untimely 
and dismissed appeal. Applicant appealed. 
The Court of Civil Appeals, Ingram, J., held 
that appeal was untimely, as application for 
rehearing was deemed denied at expiration 
of 80 days and applicant was required to 
file notice of appeal within 80 days after 
decision on application for rehearing. 
Affirmed. 
1. Administrative Law and Procedure 
«=>722 
Social Security and Public Welfare 
«=»241.115 
Medicaid benefit applicant's April 9th 
appeal from determination that applicant 
was disqualified from receiving medicaid 
benefits for period of three months, of 
which applicant was notified on January 16, 
was untimely; although applicant filed ap-
plication for rehearing on January 27 and 
was advised by letter dated March 10 of 
denial of her rehearing and notified that 
judicial review could be had under statute, 
her application for rehearing was deemed 
denied by operation of law at expiration of 
80 days, on February 26, and applicant was 
statutorily required to file notice of appeal 
within 30 days after decision on application 
for rehearing, so notice of appeal should 
have been filed within 30 days of date 
application for rehearing was deemed de-
nied, February 26. Code 1975, §§ 41-22-
17(a, e), 41-22-20(a, d). 
2. Administrative Law and Procedure 
«=»722 
Social Security and Public Welfare 
*=*241.115 
Letter advising medicaid benefit appli-
cant of denial of her application for rehear-
ing and notifying applicant that judicial 
review could be had under statute was not 
sufficient to extend applicant's time for 
seeking judicial review; no active misrepre-
sentation of date of decision relevant to 
time for review was made. Code 1975, 
§§ 41-22-17(a, e), 41~22-20(a, d). 
Lawrence F. Gardella of Legal Services 
Corp. of Alabama, Inc., Montgomery, for 
appellant 
Don Siegelman, Atty. Gen., and J. Thom-
as Leverette, Asst Atty. Gen., for appel-
lees. 
INGRAM, Judge. 
This appeal arises under the Alabama 
Administrative Procedure Act, Ala. Code 
1975, § 41-22-1, et seq. (act), from an ad-
ministrative hearing decision by the Ala-
DAVIS v. ALABAMA MEDICAID AGENCY 
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bama Medicaid Agency (agency) denying 
applicant's medicaid benefits for three 
months. The circuit court found that the 
applicant's notice of appeal was untimely 
and dismissed the appeal. The applicant 
now appeals to this court 
The dispositive issue on appeal is wheth-
er or not the circuit court erred in dismiss-
ing the appeal. 
The record in pertinent part reveals that 
on January 16, 1987, the applicant was 
notified that she was disqualified from re-
ceiving medicaid benefits for a period of 
three months. The applicant then filed an 
application for rehearing on January 27, 
1987. By letter dated March 10, 1987, the 
applicant was advised of the denial of her 
rehearing and notified that judicial review 
could be had under the act On April 15, 
1987, the agency received applicant's notice 
of appeal by letter dated April 9, 1987. 
[1] The applicant contends that the peri-
od of time within which she had to file her 
notice of appeal ran from March 10, 1987, 
the date the agency sent the letter notify-
ing applicant of their decision. The agen-
cy, however, contends that the time to file 
the notice of appeal ran from the date the 
application for rehearing was deemed de-
nied by law, February 26,1987. 
The applicable provisions of the act are 
as follows: 
"(a) Any party to a contested case who 
deems himself aggrieved by a final order 
and who desires to have the same mod-
ified or set aside may, within 15 days 
after entry of said order, file an applica-
tion for rehearing, which shall specify in 
detail the grounds for the relief sought 
therein and authorities in support there-
of. 
"(e) . . . . If the agency enters no order 
whatsoever regarding the application 
within the 30-day period, the application 
shall be deemed to have been denied as 
of the expiration of the 80-day period. 
(Acts 1981, No. 81-355, p. 1584, g 17.)" 
Sections 41-2fc-17(a) and (e). 
"(a) A person who has exhausted all 
administrative remedies available within 
the agency (other than rehearing) and 
who is aggrieved by a final decision in a 
contested case is entitled to judicial re-
view under this chapter. A preliminary, 
procedural, or intermediate agency action 
or ruling is immediately reviewable if 
review of the final agency decision would 
not provide an adequate remedy. 
"(d) The notice of appeal or review 
shall be filed within SO days after the 
receipt of the notice of or other service 
of the final decision of the agency upon 
the petitioner or, if a rehearing is re-
quested under section 41-22-17, within 
SO days after the decision thereon." 
Sections 41-22-20(a) and (d). 
It is clear from the above provision that 
if the agency does not enter an order with-
in thirty days of the filing of the applica-
tion for rehearing, the application is 
deemed denied by operation of law at the 
expiration of the thirty-day period. Ala. 
Code 1975, § 41-2&-17(e). Further, the 
statute is clear that the applicant is re-
quired to file the notice of appeal within 
thirty days after the decision on the appli-
cation for rehearing. Ala. Code 41-22-
20(d). 
Here, the application for rehearing was 
filed on January 27,1987, and by operation 
of law was deemed denied on February 26, 
1987. Therefore, pursuant to the act, the 
notice of appeal should have been filed 
within thirty days from February 26, 1987. 
As this was not done, the trial court did not 
err in dismissing the appeal. 
Additionally, we agree with the trial 
court's apt and concise analogy, which fol-
lows: 
"Appeals from agency decisions are 
purely statutory, and the time constric-
tions must be satisfied. Although this 
result may seem harsh at first blush, our 
Rules of Civil Procedure have a similar 
mechanism embodied in Rule 59.1, A.R. 
Civ.P. A motion for new trial, et cetera, 
is deemed denied if not ruled on within 
90 days. The fact that a court may enter 
an order after the 90 day period ruling 
on the motion has no effect in determin-
ing the date that the notice of appeal 
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must be filed. The order is a mere nulli-
ty. Olson vs. Olson, 367 So.2d 604 (Ala. 
Civ.App.1979)." 
[2] We further note that this case is 
factually distinguishable from Ex parte 
Four Seasons, Lta\t 450 So.2d 110 (Ala. 
1984). In Ex parte Four Seasons, the 
supreme court held that the secretary ac-
tively misrepresented in the notice to the 
taxpayer that the final decision was "this 
date." No such active misrepresentation 
occurred in the instant case. The letter 
dated March 10, 1987, to the applicant sim-
ply stated that the rehearing was denied 
and advised the applicant that judicial re-
view was pursuant to the act 
In view of the above, it is clear that the 
circuit court did not err in dismissing the 
applicant's petition for review in that she 
failed to timely file her notice of appeal 
pursuant to the act 
This case is due to be affirmed. 
AFFIRMED. 
BRADLEY, PJ., and HOLMES, J., 
concur. 
STATE of Alabama, DEPARTMENT OF 
HUMAN RESOURCES 
v. 
Glenda M1DDLETON and 
Clarence Middleton. 
(In the Matter of Marcella EUxabeth 
MIDDLETON). 
Civ. 6022. 
Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama. 
Dec. 9, 1987. 
Department of Human Resources ap-
pealed from judgment of the Juvenile 
Court, Mobile County, John F. Butler, J., 
relieving parents of duty to support child. 
The Court of Civil Appeals, Edward N. 
Scruggs, Retired Circuit Judge, held that 
parents of adopted child could not be re-
lieved of child support obligation on basis 
of expenses they had incurred in placing 
child in psychiatric care. 
Reversed and remanded. 
1. Infants *»250, 252 
After trial at which evidence was 
presented ore tenus, action of juvenile 
court will be given every favorable pre-
sumption and it will not be altered on ap-
peal if it was supported by credible evi-
dence unless it was palpably wrong. 
2. Parent and Child «=»3.3(8) 
After order of support has been en-
tered by court, it can be modified only 
where there has been material change in 
circumstances which occurred after entry 
of last child support judgment 
3. Parent and Child *»3.3(7) 
Although determination of amount of 
child support rests within discretion of trial 
court, as does modification of child support, 
trial court's decision as to amount of sup-
port is bound by legal evidence or lack 
thereof. 
4. Infants *=»228 
Parents of adopted child could not be 
relieved of child support obligation on basis 
of expenses they had incurred in placing 
child in psychiatric care, absent showing of 
any change in circumstances of either 
needs of child or ability of parents to pay 
since entry of support order. 
William Prendergast and Lois Brasfield, 
Asst Attys. Gen., for appellant 
No brief for appellees. 
EDWARD N. SCRUGGS, Retired 
Circuit Judge. 
This is a child support case. Beth, the 
child here involved, was born in 1969, and 
she was adopted by the Middletons (par-
ents) when she was fifteen months old. 
DEPT. OF HUMAN RESOURCES v. MIDDLETON 
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In June 1982 the parents placed Beth in a 
hospital for treatment The child has not 
resided with the parents since that time. 
She was placed in the care of the Depart-
ment of Human Resources (Department) in 
1983 under a boarding home agreement 
The parents agreed on November 28, 1984 
to contribute $20 per month toward Beth's 
foster care support In February 1985 the 
parents ceased making any such payments 
and, apparently, they did not pay any fur-
ther child support for Beth after that time. 
Beth's temporary custody was granted to 
the Department in July 1983, and the par-
ents were ordered to pay $60 per month to 
the Department for child support That 
amount was reduced on September 4, 1985 
to $40 per month. On January 29,1987 the 
circuit court in a suit by the Division of 
Investigation and Recovery ordered the 
parents to pay an arrearage of $450 and to 
pay $70 per week as continuing child sup-
port Therein, the trial court made a spe-
cific finding that the father's weekly take-
home pay was $440. The parents filed a 
notice of appeal from that child support 
order but they dismissed their appeal on 
March 11, 1987. 
The parents' juvenile court motion of 
February 23, 1987, as later amended, 
sought a termination of their parental 
rights and of their duty to support Beth. 
After an evidentiary hearing on May 29, 
1987, the juvenile court issued an order on 
June 2, 1987 whereby it declined to termi-
nate the parental rights of the parents but 
it relieved them from further child support 
payments for Beth. In denying the De-
partment's motion to reconsider on June 
24, 1987, the trial court stated the follow-
ing in open court 
"I took a lot of things into consideration 
in relieving them of child support More 
than just the ability to pay was con-
sidered. It was my opinion that these 
people have done all they possibly could 
do, with and for this girl, for a great 
number of years. Mr. Piereon, I'm deny-
ing the motion. I just feel like what I 
did was appropriate in the matter. They 
had considerable expense over a number 
of years, placing her in psychiatric care, 
paying for it—the overage from their 
insurance set them back a great deal, 
and I remember that They had her 
placed in several treatment hospitals, and 
they incurred for a great number of 
years some excessive expenses over and 
above what one would have had for an 
ordinary child, and it was an adopted 
child, and the only distinction there is, 
the child, herself, has sought to be re-
moved from the home. 
" . , . My position is, that the Court who 
last heard this, didn't consider those 
things and perhaps they should have. 
This family had some excessive expendi-
tures over year after year after year, 
and from which they are just now recov-
ering." 
The Department timely appealed. 
[1] After a trial at which evidence was 
presented ore tenus, the action of the juve-
nile court will be given every favorable 
presumption and it will not be altered on 
appeal if it was supported by credible evi-
dence unless it was palpably wrong. 
Witcher v. Motley, 417 So.2d 208 (Ala.Civ. 
App.1982). Here, evidence of the financial 
condition of the parents was not presented 
to the trial court at either the May 1987 or 
June 1987 hearing. The parents did not 
testify on either occasion. The Department 
is paying $57 per day for the eighteen-year-
old child's care and treatment for severe 
depression. 
[2,3] After an order of support has 
been entered by a court, it can be modified 
only where there has been a material 
change in circumstances which occurred af-
ter the entry of the last child support judg-
ment Lyle v. Lyle, 497 So.2d 154 (Ala.Civ. 
App.1986). Although the determination of 
an amount of child support rests within the 
discretion of the trial court, Banks v. Spur-
lock, 470 So.2d 1300 (Ala.Civ.App.1985), as 
does the modification of child support, 
Jones v. Jones, 462 So.2d 875 (Ala.Civ.App. 
1984), the trial court's decision as to the 
amount of support is bound by legal evi-
dence or the lack thereof. Langford v. 
Langford, 441 So.2d 962 (Ala.Civ.App. 
1983). 
